Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (USSC+)
Case Information 
Plessy v. Ferguson

                                 No. 210

                  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                               163 U.S. 537
                               April 18, 1886
                               May 18, 1886

         ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Syllabus 

The statute of Louisiana, acts of 1890, c. 111, requiring railway companies carrying
passengers in their coaches in that State, to provide equal, but separate, accommodations
for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each
passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure
separate accommodations; and providing that no person shall be permitted to occupy seats
in coaches other than the ones assigned to them, on account [p*538] of the race they
belong to; and requiring the officer of the passenger train to assign each passenger to the
coach or compartment assigned for the race to which he or she belong; and imposing fines
or imprisonment upon passengers insisting on going into a coach or compartment other
than the one set aide for the race to which he or she belongs; and conferring upon officers
of the train power to refuse to carry on the train passengers refusing to occupy the coach
or compartment assigned to them, and exempting the railway company from liability for
such refusal, are not in conflict with the provisions either of the Thirteenth Amendment or of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

This was a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari, originally filed in the Supreme
Court of the State by Plessy, the plaintiff in error, against the Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge
of the criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans, and setting forth in substance the
following facts:

That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Louisiana,
of mixed descent, in the proportion of seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African
blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was entitled
to every recognition, right, privilege and immunity secured to the citizens of the United
States of the white race by its Constitution and laws; that, on June 7, 1892, he engaged
and paid for a first class passage on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans to
Covington, in the same State, and thereupon entered a passenger train, and took
possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were
accommodated; that such railroad company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a
common carrier, and was not authorized to distinguish between citizens according to their
race. But, notwithstanding this, petitioner was required by the conductor, under penalty of
ejection from said train and imprisonment, to vacate said coach and occupy another seat in
a coach assigned by said company for persons not of the white race, and for no other
reason than that petitioner was of the colored race; that, upon petitioner's refusal to comply
with such order, he was, with the aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected from said coach and
hurried off to and imprisoned in the parish jail of [p*539] New Orleans, and there held to
answer a charge made by such officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally
violated an act of the General Assembly of the State, approved July 10, 1890, in such case
made and provided.

That petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of the city for preliminary
examination and committed for trial to the criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans,
where an information was filed against him in the matter above set forth, for a violation of
the above act, which act the petitioner affirmed to be null and void, because in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States; that petitioner interposed a plea to such information
based upon the unconstitutionality of the act of the General Assembly, to which the district
attorney, on behalf of the State, filed a demurrer; that, upon issue being joined upon such
demurrer and plea, the court sustained the demurrer, overruled the plea, and ordered
petitioner to plead over to the facts set forth in the information, and that, unless the judge
of the said court be enjoined by a writ of prohibition from further proceeding in such case,
the court will proceed to fine and sentence petitioner to imprisonment, and thus deprive him
of his constitutional rights set forth in his said plea, notwithstanding the unconstitutional-
ity of the act under which he was being prosecuted; that no appeal lay from such sentence,
and petitioner was without relief or remedy except by writs of prohibition and certiorari.
Copies of the information and other proceedings in the criminal District Court were annexed
to the petition as an exhibit.

Upon the filing of this petition, an order was issued upon the respondent to show cause why
a writ of prohibition should not issue and be made perpetual, and a further order that the
record of the proceedings had in the criminal cause be certified and transmitted to the
Supreme Court.

To this order the respondent made answer, transmitting a certified copy of the
proceedings, asserting the constitutionality of the law, and averring that, instead of
pleading or admitting that he belonged to the colored race, the said Plessy declined and
refused, either by pleading or otherwise, to admit [p*540] that he was in any sense or in
any proportion a colored man.

The case coming on for a hearing before the Supreme Court, that court was of opinion that
the law under which the prosecution was had was constitutional, and denied the relief
prayed for by the petitioner. Ex parte Plessy, 45 La.Ann. 80. Whereupon petitioner prayed
for a writ of error from this court, which was allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana.

Opinions 

                      BROWN, J., Opinion of the Court 

MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and
colored races. Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.

The first section of the statute enacts

that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State shall provide
equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races by providing two or
more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches
by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations: Provided, That this section shall
not be construed to apply to street railroads. No person or persons, shall be admitted to
occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned to them on account of the race
they belong to.

By the second section, it was enacted

that the officers of such passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required
[p*541] to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which
such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a coach or compartment to
which by race he does not belong shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu
thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the parish prison, and
any officer of any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or compartment
other than the one set aside for the race to which said passenger belongs shall be liable to
a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than
twenty days in the parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach or
compartment to which he or she is assigned by the officer of such railway, said officer shall
have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he
nor the railway company which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the
courts of this State.

The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors,
conductors, and employees of railway companies to comply with the act, with a proviso that
"nothing in this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other
race." The fourth section is immaterial.

The information filed in the criminal District Court charged in substance that Plessy, being
a passenger between two stations within the State of Louisiana, was assigned by officers
of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon
going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither in the information
nor plea was his particular race or color averred. The petition for the writ of prohibition
averred that petitioner was seven-eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that
the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was entitled to every
right, privilege and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of the white race; and
that, upon such theory, he took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers
of the white race were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate
[p*542] said coach and take a seat in another assigned to persons of the colored race,
and, having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected with the aid of a
police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the
above act.

The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it conflicts both with the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the States.

1. That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery
implies involuntary servitude -- a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel,
or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and
the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and services. This
amendment was said in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 , to have been intended
primarily to abolish slavery as it had been previously known in this country, and that it
equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade when they amounted to
slavery or involuntary servitude, and that the use of the word "servitude" was intended to
prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name. It was
intimated, however, in that case that this amendment was regarded by the statesmen of
that day as insufficient to protect the colored race from certain laws which had been
enacted in the Southern States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and
burdens and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an
extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was
devised to meet this exigency.

So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 , 24 , it was said that the act of a mere
individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing
accommodations to colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but [p*543] only as involving an ordinary civil
injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the State and presumably subject to redress by
those laws until the contrary appears. "It would be running the slavery argument into the
ground," said Mr. Justice Bradley,

to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or
admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.

A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races -- a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color -- has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.
Indeed, we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon
by the plaintiff in error in this connection.

2. By the Fourteenth Amendment, all persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The proper construction of this amendment was first called to the attention of this court in
the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 , which involved, however, not a question of race,
but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to
the exact rights it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that
its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to give definitions of
citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect from the hostile legislation
of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished
from those of citizens of the States. [p*544]

The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political,
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and
have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which
has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States
where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly
enforced.

One of the earliest of these cases is that of Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 19, in which
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the general school committee of
Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate
schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other
schools. "The great principle," said Chief Justice Shaw, p. 206, "advanced by the learned
and eloquent advocate for the plaintiff" (Mr. Charles Sumner),

is that, by the constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age
or sex, birth or color, origin or condition, are equal before the law. . . . But when this great
principle comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it
will not warrant the assertion that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil
and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same functions
and be subject to the same treatment, but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and
regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the
law for their maintenance and security.

It was held that the powers of the committee extended to the establishment [p*545] of
separate schools for children of different ages, sexes and colors, and that they might also
establish special schools for poor and neglected children, who have become too old to
attend the primary school and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning to enable
them to enter the ordinary schools. Similar laws have been enacted by Congress under its
general power of legislation over the District of Columbia, Rev.Stat.D.C. §§ 281, 282, 283,
310, 319, as well as by the legislatures of many of the States, and have been generally, if
not uniformly, sustained by the courts. State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198; Lehew v.
Brummell, 15 S.W.Rep. 765; Ward v. Flood, 48 California 36; Bertonneau v. School
Directors, 3 Woods 177; People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438; Cory v. Carter, 48 Indiana 897;
Dawson v. Lee, 3 Kentucky 49.

Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to
interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within
the police power of the State. State v. Gibson, 36 Indiana 389.

The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those
requiring the separation of the two races in schools, theatres and railway carriages has
been frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , it
was held that a law of West Virginia limiting to white male persons, 21 years of age and
citizens of the State, the right to sit upon juries was a discrimination which implied a legal
inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of the right of the colored race, and
was a step toward reducing them to a condition of servility. Indeed, the right of a colored
man that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty and property, there shall 
be no exclusion of his race and no discrimination against them because of color has been
asserted in a number of cases. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
370; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565. So, where the
laws of a particular locality or the charter of a particular railway corporation has provided
that no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of [p*546] color, we have held
that this meant that persons of color should travel in the same car as white ones, and that
the enactment was not satisfied by the company's providing cars assigned exclusively to
people of color, though they were as good as those which they assigned exclusively to
white persons. Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445.

Upon the other hand, where a statute of Louisiana required those engaged in the
transportation of passengers among the States to give to all persons traveling within that
State, upon vessels employed in that business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of
the vessel, without distinction on account of race or color, and subjected to an action for
damages the owner of such a vessel, who excluded colored passengers on account of
their color from the cabin set aside by him for the use of whites, it was held to be, so far as
it applied to interstate commerce, unconstitutional and void. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 48.
The court in this case, however, expressly disclaimed that it had anything whatever to do
with the statute as a regulation of internal commerce, or affecting anything else than
commerce among the States.

In the Civil Rights Case, 109 U.S. 3 , it was held that an act of Congress entitling all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances, on land
or water, theatres and other places of public amusement, and made applicable to citizens
of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude, was
unconstitutional and void upon the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment was prohibitory
upon the States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for
enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters respecting which the States were
prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was corrective
legislation such as might be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the
effect of such laws or acts. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Bradley
observed that the Fourteenth Amendment

does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects that are within the [p*547]
domain of state legislation, but to provide modes of relief against state legislation or state
action of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the
operation of state laws and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these
are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and
privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are secured
by way of prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such
prohibition into effect, and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such
supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their
operation and effect.

Much nearer, and, indeed, almost directly in point is the case of the Louisville, New
Orleans &c. Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, wherein the railway company was
indicted for a violation of a statute of Mississippi enacting that all railroads carrying
passengers should provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored
races by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the
passenger cars by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations. The case was
presented in a different aspect from the one under consideration, inasmuch as it was an
indictment against the railway company for failing to provide the separate
accommodations, but the question considered was the constitutionality of the law. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, 66 Mississippi 662, had held that the statute
applied solely to commerce within the State, and that, being the construction of the state
statute by its highest court, was accepted as conclusive. "If it be a matter," said the court,
p. 591, respecting commerce wholly within a State, and not interfering with commerce between the
States, then obviously there is no violation of the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution. . . . No question arises under this section as to the power of the State to
separate in different compartments interstate passengers [p*548] or affect in any manner
the privileges and rights of such passengers. All that we can consider is whether the State
has the power to require that railroad trains within her limits shall have separate
accommodations for the two races; that affecting only commerce within the State is no
invasion of the power given to Congress by the commerce clause.

A like course of reasoning applies to the case under consideration, since the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in the case of the State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, Judge, et al., 44 La.Ann.
770, held that the statute in question did not apply to interstate passengers, but was
confined in its application to passengers traveling exclusively within the borders of the
State. The case was decided largely upon the authority of Railway Co. v. State, 66
Mississippi 662, and affirmed by this court in 133 U.S. 587. In the present case, no
question of interference with interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East
Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both its termini within the
State of Louisiana. Similar statutes for the separation of the to races upon public
conveyances were held to be constitutional in West Chester &c. Railroad v. Miles, 55
Penn.St. 209; Day v. Owen, 5 Michigan 520; Chicago &c. Railway v. Williams, 5 Illinois 185;
Chesapeake &c. Railroad v. Wells, 85 Tennessee 613; Memphis &c. Railroad v. Benson,
85 Tennessee 627; The Sue, 22 Fed.Rep. 83; Logwood v. Memphis &c. Railroad, 23
Fed.Rep. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed.Rep. 639; People v. King, 18 N.E.Rep. 245;
Houck v. South Pac. Railway, 38 Fed.Rep. 226; Heard v. Georgia Railroad Co., 3
Int.Com.Com'n 111; S.C., 1 Ibid. 428.

While we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce
of the State, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him
of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are not prepared to say that the
conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does not act at
his peril, or that the provision of the second section of the act that denies to the passenger
compensation [p*549] in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which he
properly belongs is a valid exercise of the legislative power. Indeed, we understand it to be
conceded by the State's Attorney that such part of the act as exempts from liability the
railway company and its officers is unconstitutional. The power to assign to a particular
coach obviously implies the power to determine to which race the passenger belongs, as
well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular State, is to be deemed
a white and who a colored person. This question, though indicated in the brief of the
plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon the record in this case, since the only issue
made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act so far as it requires the railway to provide
separate accommodations and the conductor to assign passengers according to their
race.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of
belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is property in the same
sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property. Conceding this to be so for the
purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way
affects his right to, such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach,
he may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his
so-called property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man and be so assigned, he
has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of
being a white man.

In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that
the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to provide
separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to require separate
cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who
belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one
side of the street and white people upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be
painted white and colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different
colors, upon the theory that one side [p*550] of the street is as good as the other, or that a
house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color. The reply to all this is
that every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws
as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the public good, and not for the
annoyance or oppression of a particular class. Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
, it was held by this court that a municipal ordinance of the city of San Francisco to
regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of the municipality violated the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States if it conferred upon the municipal
authorities arbitrary power, at their own will and without regard to discretion, in the legal
sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places without regard to
the competency of the persons applying or the propriety of the places selected for the
carrying on of the business. It was held to be a covert attempt on the part of the
municipality to make an arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race. While
this was the case of a municipal ordinance, a like principle has been held to apply to acts
of a state legislature passed in the exercise of the police power. Railroad Company v.
Husen, 95 U.S. 465; Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, and cases
cited on p. 700; Duggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 48; State
ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wisconsin 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 66; Hulseman v.
Rems, 41 Penn. St. 396; Orman v. Riley, 1 California 48.

So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces
itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and, with
respect to this, there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature.
In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation of the two races in public conveyances [p*551] is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does
not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily
assumes that if, as has been more than once the case and is not unlikely to be so again,
the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should
enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior
position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.
The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and
that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the
two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said by the Court of Appeals
of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448,

this end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general
sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed to operate. When the
government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and
equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it
was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with which
it is endowed.

Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon
physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal,
one cannot be inferior to the other civilly [p*552] or politically. If one race be inferior to 
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.

It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a
colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a
difference of opinion in the different States, some holding that any visible admixture of
black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race (State v. Chaver, 5 Jones
[N.C.] 1, p. 11); others that it depends upon the preponderance of blood (Gray v. State, 4
Ohio 354; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665); and still others that the predominance of
white blood must only be in the proportion of three-fourths. (People v. Dean, 4 Michigan
406; Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Virginia 538). But these are questions to be determined
under the laws of each State, and are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the
allegations of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether,
under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.

The judgment of the court below is, therefore,

Affirmed.

                      HARLAN, J., Dissenting Opinion 

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

By the Louisiana statute the validity of which is here involved, all railway companies (other
than street railroad companies) carrying passengers in that State are required to have
separate but equal accommodations for white and colored persons by providing two or more 
passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the
passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations.

Under this statute, no colored person is permitted to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to
white persons, nor any white person to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to colored
persons. The managers of the railroad are not allowed to exercise any discretion in the
premises, but are required to assign each passenger to some coach or compartment set
apart for the exclusive use of his race. If a passenger insists upon going into a coach or
compartment not set apart for persons of his race, [p*553] he is subject to be fined or to
be imprisoned in the parish jail. Penalties are prescribed for the refusal or neglect of the
officers, directors, conductors and employees of railroad companies to comply with the
provisions of the act.

Only "nurses attending children of the other race " are excepted from the operation of the
statute. No exception is made of colored attendants traveling with adults. A white man is
not permitted to have his colored servant with him in the same coach, even if his condition
of health requires the constant, personal assistance of such servant. If a colored maid
insists upon riding in the same coach with a white woman whom she has been employed to
serve, and who may need her personal attention while traveling, she is subject to be fined
or imprisoned for such an exhibition of zeal in the discharge of duty.

While there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who are not citizens of the
United States, the words in the act "white and colored races" necessarily include all citizens
of the United States of both races residing in that State. So that we have before us a state
enactment that compels, under penalties, the separation of the two races in railroad
passenger coaches, and makes it a crime for a citizen of either race to enter a coach that
has been assigned to citizens of the other race.

Thus, the State regulates the use of a public highway by citizens of the United States
solely upon the basis of race.

However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider
whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

That a railroad is a public highway, and that the corporation which owns or operates it is in
the exercise of public functions, is not, at this day, to be disputed. Mr. Justice Nelson,
speaking for this court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.
344, 382, said that a common carrier was in the exercise

of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform, from which he should not be
permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned.

Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the judgment of [p*554] this court in Olcott v. The
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 694, said:

That railroads, though constructed by private corporations and owned by them, are public
highways has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts ever since such conveniences for
passage and transportation have had any existence. Very early the question arose
whether a State's right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation
created for the purpose of constructing a railroad. Clearly it could not unless taking land
for such a purpose by such an agency is taking land for public use. The right of eminent
domain nowhere justifies taking property for a private use. Yet it is a doctrine universally
accepted that a state legislature may authorize a private corporation to take land for the
construction of such a road, making compensation to the owner. What else does this
doctrine mean if not that building a railroad, though it be built by a private corporation, is
an act done for a public use.

So, in Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 676: "Though the corporation [a
railroad company] was private, its work was public, as much so as if it were to be
constructed by the State." So, in Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western Railroad
Corporation, 4 Met. 564:

The establishment of that great thoroughfare is regarded as a public work, established by
public authority, intended for the public use and benefit, the use of which is secured to the
whole community, and constitutes, therefore, like a canal, turnpike or highway, a public
easement. It is true that the real and personal property necessary to the establishment
and management of the railroad is vested in the corporation, but it is in trust for the public.

In respect of civil rights common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does
not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in
the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and, under appropriate
circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected,
it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him
seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to
the [p*555] race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved. Indeed, such
legislation as that here in question is inconsistent not only with that equality of rights 
which pertains to citizenship, National and State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by
everyone within the United States.

The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right
necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the institution of slavery as
previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or
disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom
in this country. This court has so adjudged. But that amendment having been found
inadequate to the protection of the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was followed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, which added greatly to the dignity and glory of American
citizenship and to the security of personal liberty by declaring that

all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,

and that

no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent and meaning, will protect
all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship. Finally, and to the end that no
citizen should be denied, on account of his race, the privilege of participating in the
political control of his country, it as declared by the Fifteenth Amendment that

the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.

These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty
throughout the world. They removed the race line from our governmental systems. They
had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely to secure
to a race recently emancipated, a race that through [p*556] many generations have been
held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.

They declared, in legal effect, this court has further said,

that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color.

We also said:

The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -- exemption
from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, Lessening the security of 
their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.

It was, consequently, adjudged that a state law that excluded citizens of the colored race
from juries, because of their race and however well qualified in other respects to discharge
the duties of jurymen, was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , 306 , 307 ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313; Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 116. At
the present term, referring to the previous adjudications, this court declared that

underlying all of those decisions is the principle that the Constitution of the United States,
in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, 
discrimination by the General Government or the States against any citizen because of his race.
All citizens are equal before the law.

Gibson v. Mississippi,162 U.S. 565.

The decisions referred to show the scope of the recent amendments of the Constitution.
They also show that it is not within the power of a State to prohibit colored citizens,
because of their race, from participating as jurors in the administration of justice.

It as said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does [p*557] not discriminate against
either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this
argument does not meet the difficulty. Everyone knows that the statute in question had its
origin in the purpose not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in
the matter of accommodation for travelers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise
of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to
themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in
candor a to assert the contrary. The fundamental objection, therefore, to the statute is that
it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens. "Personal liberty," it has been well said,
consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to
whatsoever places one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint
unless by due course of law.

1 Bl.Com. *134. If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public
conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no government, proceeding
alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of each.

It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal
accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing
for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from traveling in the same
public conveyance, and to punish officers of railroad companies for permitting persons of
the two races to occupy the same passenger coach. If a State can prescribe, as a rule of
civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad
coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel
white citizens to keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why
may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in streetcars or
in open vehicles on a public road [p*558] or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to
assign whites to one side of a courtroom and blacks to the other? And why may it not also
prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in public
assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the day? Further,
if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not
the State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of
the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?

The answer given at the argument to these questions was that regulations of the kind they
suggest would be unreasonable, and could not, therefore, stand before the law. Is it meant
that the determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the inquiry whether
the statute whose validity is questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable one,
taking all the circumstances into consideration? A statute may be unreasonable merely
because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I do not understand that the
courts have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation. A statute may be
valid and yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be characterized as unreasonable.
Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says that, the legislative intention being
clearly ascertained,

the courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any
regard to their views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.

Stat. & Const.Constr. 324. There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge
the functions of the courts by means of judicial interference with the will of the people as
expressed by the legislature. Our institutions have the distinguishing characteristic that the
three departments of government are coordinate and separate. Each must keep within the
limits defined by the Constitution. And the courts best discharge their duty by executing the
will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to
be dealt with by the people through their representatives. Statutes must always have a
reasonable construction. Sometimes they are to be construed strictly; sometimes liberally,
in order to carry out the legislative [p*559] will. But however construed, the intent of the
legislature is to be respected, if the particular statute in question is valid, although the
courts, looking at the public interests, may conceive the statute to be both unreasonable
and impolitic. If the power exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the
courts are concerned. The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be void
because unreasonable are those in which the means employed by the legislature were not
at all germane to the end to which the legislature was competent.

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is in prestige,
in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in 
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or
of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the
fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to
regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.

In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious
as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case. It was adjudged in that case
that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves
were not included nor intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution,
and could not claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument provided for and
secured to citizens of the United States; that, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, they were

considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant [p*560] race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
government might choose to grant them.

19 How. 393, 404. The recent amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had
eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of
the States, a dominant race -- a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the
enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race. The present
decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less
brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the
belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes
which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent
amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were made
citizens of the United States and of the States in which they respectively reside, and whose
privileges and immunities, as citizens, the States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of
whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of
the two races in this country are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both
require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens.
That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct,
unconditional recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that
inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United
States, without regard to race. State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil rights
upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the [p*561]
war under the pretence of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to
render permanent peace impossible and to keep alive a conflict of races the continuance
of which must do harm to all concerned. This question is not met by the suggestion that
social equality cannot exist between the white and black races in this country. That
argument, if it can be properly regarded as one, is scarcely worthy of consideration, for
social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in a passenger coach or a
public highway than when members of the same races sit by each other in a street car or
in the jury box, or stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when they use in
common the street of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of
having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach the ballot box
in order to exercise the high privilege of voting.

There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute in
question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the
United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked
their lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the
political control of the State and nation, who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their
race, from public stations of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that belong to white
citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public
coach occupied by citizens of the white race. It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen
should not object to occupying a public coach assigned to his own race. He does not
object, nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches for his race if his rights under
the law were recognized. But he objecting, and ought never to cease objecting, to the
proposition that citizens of the white and black race can be adjudged criminals because
they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public coach on a public highway. [p*562]

The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race while they are on a public highway
is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before
the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established
for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from 
state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast of 
the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that
boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation
upon a large class of our fellow citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of
"equal" accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor
atone for the wrong this day done.

The result of the whole matter is that, while this court has frequently adjudged, and at the
present term has recognized the doctrine, that a State cannot, consistently with the
Constitution of the United States, prevent white and black citizens, having the required
qualifications for jury service, from sitting in the same jury box, it is now solemnly held that
a State may prohibit white and black citizens from sitting in the same passenger coach on
a public highway, or may require that they be separated by a "partition," when in the same
passenger coach. May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men of the dominant
race, who affect to be disturbed at the possibility that the integrity of the white race may be
corrupted, or that its supremacy will be imperiled, by contact on public highways with black
people, will endeavor to procure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be separated
in the jury box by a "partition," and that, upon retiring from the courtroom to consult as to
their verdict, such partition, if it be a moveable one, shall be taken to their consultation
room and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from coming too close to their
brother jurors of the white race. If the "partition" used in the courtroom happens to be
stationary, provision could be made for screens with openings through [p*563] which jurors
of the two races could confer as to their verdict without coming into personal contact with
each other. I cannot see but that, according to the principles this day announced, such
state legislation, although conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of
humiliating, citizens of the United States of a particular race, would be held to be consistent
with the Constitution.

I do not deem it necessary to review the decisions of state courts to which reference was
made in argument. Some, and the most important, of them are wholly inapplicable because
rendered prior to the adoption of the last amendments of the Constitution, when colored
people had very few rights which the dominant race felt obliged to respect. Others were
made at a time when public opinion in many localities was dominated by the institution of
slavery, when it would not have been safe to do justice to the black man, and when, so far
as the rights of blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of
the land. Those decisions cannot be guides in the era introduced by the recent
amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom, gave
citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States and residing here, obliterated the
race line from our systems of governments, National and State, and placed our free
institutions upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law.

I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of
citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the
Constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several
States of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an
institution tolerated by law would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but there
would remain a power in the States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the blessings of freedom to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon
the basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American
citizens now constituting a part of the political community called the [p*564] People of the
United States, for whom and by whom, through representatives, our government is
administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to
each State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by
Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the
supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.

For the reasons stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and
judgment of the majority.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument or participate in the decision of this
case.

---------------------------



Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(USSC+)

Case Information 

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

                                 No. 1.

                  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              347 U.S. 483

                         Argued December 9, 1952

                        Reargued December 8, 1953

                           Decided May 17, 1954

   APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
                               KANSAS [*] 

Syllabus 

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the
basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to
Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment -- even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and
Negro schools may be equal. Pp. 486-496 .

(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on
public education. Pp. 489-490 .

(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of
conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the
full development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation. Pp. 492-493 .

(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public
schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. P. 493 .

(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical
facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal. Pp. 493-494 .

(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 , has
no place in the field of public education. P. 495 .

(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions
relating to the forms of the decrees. Pp. 495-496 .

Opinions 

                    WARREN, C.J., Opinion of the Court 

[p*486] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a
common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.
[n1] [p*487]

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek
the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a
nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [p*488] they had been denied admission to
schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation
according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than
the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the
so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Fergson,
163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the
Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered
that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the
Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be
made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.
[n2] Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on
certain questions propounded by the Court. [n3] [p*489]

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment
in Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and
the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all
legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their
opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress
and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history with respect
to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. [n4] In the South, the
movement toward free common schools, supported [p*490] by general taxation, had not
yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups.
Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate.
In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast,
many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in
the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of
the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on
Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North,
the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The
curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the
school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school
attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should
be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on
public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after
its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations
against the Negro race. [n5] The doctrine of [p*491] "separate but equal" did not make its
appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not
education but transportation. [n6] American courts have since labored with the doctrine for
over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but
equal" doctrine in the field of public education. [n7] In Cumming v. County Board of
Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine
itself was not challenged. [n8] In more recent cases, all on the graduate school [p*492]
level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied
to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 . In none of these cases was it
necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v.
Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v.
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter,
there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized,
or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of
teachers, and other "tangible" factors. [n9] Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely
a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of
the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout [p*493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors
may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not
provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a
law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a
Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again
resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." [p*494]
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To
separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on
their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court
which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. [n10] 

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. [n11] Any language [p*495]
in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has
no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. [n12] 

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and
because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases
presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of
appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the
constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the
full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the
docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5
previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term [n13] The Attorney
General [p*496] of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General
of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted
to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission
of briefs by October 1, 1954. [n14] 

It is so ordered.

* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued
December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart
et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December
11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of
elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which
permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate
school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan.Gen.Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant
to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated
elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a
nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281
and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro
children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were
substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational
qualifications of teachers. 98 F.Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1253.

In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both
elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin
enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the
segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S.C.Const., Art. XI, § 7; S.C.Code §
5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and
2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to
the white schools, and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the
facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the
plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F.Supp. 529.
This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose
of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress
made in the equalization program. 342 U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that
substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were
proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F.Supp. 920. The case is again here on
direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high
school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions
in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and
whites in public schools. Va.Const., § 140; Va.Code § 22-221 (1950). The three-judge
District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief.
The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation,
and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and
transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove" the
inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the
validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools
during the equalization program. 103 F.Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both
elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action
in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in
public schools. Del.Const., Art. X, § 2; Del.Rev.Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave
judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously
attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with
respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant,
and time and distance involved in travel. 87 A.2d 862. The Chancellor also found that
segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra),
but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id. at 865. The Chancellor's decree was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the
defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the
Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A.2d 137, 152. The defendants,
contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission
of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ 
was granted, 344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a
cross-petition.

2. 344 U.S. 1, 141, 891.

3. 345 U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as
amicus curiae.

4. For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment,
see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II;
Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices
current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts
and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public
Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex.Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same
pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to
gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons
for the somewhat slower development in the South (e.g., the rural character of the South
and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in
Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the
War virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id. at 427-428. The low status of
Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War,
is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941),
112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until
after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such
laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.

5. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 , 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 , 307-308 (1880): 

It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black
as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the
laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored race -- the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively
as colored -- exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.

See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
344-345 (1880).

6. The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.198, 206
(1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state
constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated
in 1855. Mass.Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North, segregation in public
education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such
segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.

7. See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

8. In the Cummin case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant
school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the
board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum
case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had
misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend
a Negro school.

9. In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98
F.Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants
were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree." 103
F.Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization
program was already "afoot and progressing" (103 F.Supp. 337, 341); since then, we
have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the
program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted
that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91 A.2d 137, 149.

10. A similar finding was made in the Delaware case:

I conclude from the testimony that, in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in
education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational
opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise
similarly situated.

87 A.2d 862, 865.

11. K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological
Effects of Enforced Segregation A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.Psychol. 259
(1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of
Equal Facilities?, 3 Int.J.Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational
Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The
Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American
Dilemma (1944).

12. See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497 , concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.

13. 

4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment

(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of
their choice, or

(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based
on color distinctions?

5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further
that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b),

(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;

(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;

(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees;

(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases and, if so, what general directions should the decrees of this
Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at
the specific terms of more detailed decrees?

14. See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).

-----------------------------------------



Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(USSC+)

Case Information 

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

                  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                               349 U.S. 294

                Reargued on the question of relief April 11-14, 1955

                 Opinion and judgments announced May 31, 1955

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
                                 KANSAS.

Syllabus 

1. Racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, 347 U.S. 483 , 497 , and all
provisions of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must
yield to this principle. P. 298 .

2. The judgments below (except that in the Delaware case) are reversed and the cases are
remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and
decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties to
these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed. P. 301 .

(a) School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving
the varied local school problems which may require solution in fully implementing the
governing constitutional principles. P. 299 .

(b) Courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good
faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. P. 299 .

(c) Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further
hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial
appraisal. P. 299 .

(d) In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles -- characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping remedies and a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. P. 300 . [p*295]

(e) At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. P. 300 .

(f) Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination in a
systematic and effective manner of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school
systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles enunciated in 347 U.S.
483 , 497; but the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield 
simply because of disagreement with them. P. 300 .

(g) While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require
that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with the
ruling of this Court. P. 300 .

(h) Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary
to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. P. 300 .

(i) The burden rests on the defendants to establish that additional time is necessary in
the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
date. P. 300 .

(j) The courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical
condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of
school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local
laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. Pp.
300-301 .

(k) The courts will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose
to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory
school system. P. 301 .

(l) During the period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. 
P. 301.

3. The judgment in the Delaware case, ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs
to schools previously attended only by white children, is affirmed on the basis of the
principles stated by this Court in its opinion, 347 U.S. 483 , but the case is remanded to
the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem
necessary in the light of this opinion. P. 301 .

98 F.Supp. 797, 103 F.Supp. 920, 103 F.Supp. 337 and judgment in No. 4, reversed and
remanded.

91 A.2d 137, affirmed and remanded. [p*298]

Opinions 

                    WARREN, C.J., Opinion of the Court 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date, [n1] declaring the
fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, are
incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or
permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. There remains for consideration
the manner in which relief is to be accorded.

Because these cases arose under different local conditions and their disposition will
involve a variety of local problems, we requested further argument on the question of
relief. [n2] In view of the nationwide importance of the decision, we invited the Attorney
General of the United [p*299] States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring or
permitting racial discrimination in public education to present their views on that question.
The parties, the United States, and the States of Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs and participated in the oral argument.

These presentations were informative and helpful to the Court in its consideration of the
complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial
discrimination. The presentations also demonstrated that substantial steps to eliminate
racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken, not only in some of the
communities in which these cases arose, but in some of the states appearing as amici
curiae, and in other states as well. Substantial progress has been made in the District of
Columbia and in the communities in Kansas and Delaware involved in this litigation. The
defendants in the cases coming to us from South Carolina and Virginia are awaiting the
decision of this Court concerning relief.

Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local
school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further
hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial
appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts. [n3]
[p*300]

In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies [n4] and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.
[n5] These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At
stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for
elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in
accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision.
Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of
such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that
the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them.

While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that
the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May
17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional
time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon
the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is
consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the
courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical
condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of
school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools [p*301] on a nonracial basis, and revision of
local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.
They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet
these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.

The judgments below, except that, in the Delaware case, are accordingly reversed, and
the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to
public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case -- ordering the immediate admission of
the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children -- is affirmed on the
basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, opinion, but the case is remanded to
the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem
necessary in light of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina; No. 3, Davis et al. v. County 
School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; No. 4, Bolling et al. v. Sharpe et 
al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, and No. 5, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Delaware.

1. 347 U.S. 483 ; 347 U.S. 497.

2. Further argument was requested on the following questions, 347 U.S. 483 , 495-496, n.
13, previously propounded by the Court: 

4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment

(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of
their choice, or

(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based
on color distinctions?

5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further
that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b),

(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;

(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;

(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees;

(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and, if so, what general directions should the decrees of this
Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at
the specific terms of more detailed decrees?

3. The cases coming to us from Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia were originally
heard by three-judge District Courts convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. These
cases will accordingly be remanded to those three-judge courts. See Briggs v. Elliott, 342
U.S. 350.

4. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239.

5. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330.